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chapter 9




As other chapters in this volume demonstrate, the increasing use and accept-
ability of written ʿāmmiyya in Egypt is nowwell-documented. Themotivations
behind this are rarely studied, although speculations havebeenmade about the
role of political ideology. One well-discussed dimension of language politics in
Egypt takes the form of a binary of Egyptian nationalism vs. pan-Arab nation-
alism: the former ideology favouring ʿāmmiyya and the latter favouring Stan-
dardArabic or fuṣḥā (Suleiman 1996; Suleiman 2003; Suleiman 2008). However,
the salience of this binary in present-day Egypt is unclear: on the one hand,
it is often suggested that Egyptian nationalism was overtaken by pan-Arab
nationalism (ibid.), and on the other, emerging literature suggests that pan-
Arab nationalism is now a spent force (Phillips 2014). Moreover, although there
has been a tendency to delimit the discussion of language politics in Egypt
to the question of nationalism, it has recently been suggested that ʿāmmiyya
might be used to counter the hegemonic discourse of the (language) authori-
ties (Bassiouney 2014; Ibrahim 2010). The symbolic significance of ʿāmmiyya in
this latter case is clearly very different (cf. Aboelezz forthcoming).
While by nomeans suggesting that political ideology is the only explanation
for the increasing use of ʿāmmiyya in written domains in Egypt, this chapter
hopes to shed light on the complicated relationship between language and
politics in Egypt. To highlight the relationship between political ideologies and
language ideologies, I draw on two interviews with what I term pro-ʿāmmiyya
‘agents of change’ in the summer of 2010. The timing of the interviews is
significant. By focussing on the political dimension, which has been at the
forefront of Egypt’s turbulent recent history, I aim to demonstrate howpolitical
ideologies reflect and relate to broader social andmoral concerns still relevant
today.
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Methodology
In this chapter, I aim to answer this central research question: What role does
language ideology play in the motivation of the two pro-ʿāmmiyya agents of
change? This research question includes two central concepts which warrant
explanation: language ideology and language change. Language ideologiesmay
be understood here as “sets of beliefs about language articulated by users
as a rationalisation or justification of perceived language structure and use”
(Silverstein 1979: 193). Milroy (2004) stresses the instrumentality of language
ideology in bringing about language change and argues that the two should be
studied in tandem. Language change may be said to occur at two levels: the
first level is the structure of the language (lexicon, grammar, etc.); the second
is the use of the language, that is, “the functional allocations of the varieties
of language used” in a speech community (Ferguson 1977: 9). This chapter is
concerned with this latter type of language change, which Ferguson notes is
usually fuelled by changes in users’ evaluations of language – or in other words,
their language ideologies.
In this chapter, I refer to groups or individuals who play an active part in
bringing about (language) change as ‘agents of change’. I focus specifically
on the ideological motives of two pro-ʿāmmiyya agents of change. The first
agent of change is the Liberal Egyptian Party (henceforth, lep), an Egyptian
political party established in 2008 with an ideology of separatist Egyptian
nationalism and an aim to standardise Egyptian Arabic. The second agent of
change is Malamih, a publishing house established in 2007 which published
work by young Egyptian writers in a range of language varieties, and crucially
championed publishing in ʿāmmiyya.
To answer the research question, interviews were conducted with represen-
tatives of lep and Malamih in the summer of 2010. From the outset, I did not
intend the interviews to be a fact-finding mission, but rather a means of elic-
iting ideological positions vis-à-vis the language situation in Egypt. Indeed, I
argue that although both lep and Malamih have now ceased to exist, the ide-
ological underpinnings of their agency in language change remain salient.
My analysis of the interviews draws on three main theoretical approaches.
The first approach draws on Eisele’s (2000; 2002; 2003)workwho has developed
one of the most elaborate frameworks for studying language ideologies in
Arabic sociolinguistics. Eisele assumes the presence of ‘authorising discourses’
in society, which he terms regimes of authority:
Each of the regimes of authority present in a society/culturemay have an
effect on the kind of language which is valorized, and on themetalinguis-
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tic views of language in general, and ultimately on the views and analyses
of language professionals themselves (linguists, grammar specialists, lan-
guage teachers, l1 and l2), who participate as well in their own discursive
regimes of authority.
eisele, 2002: 5
However, he notes that “individuals do not always adopt the value system
of one regime of authority alone and for all time, but rather manipulate the
various regimes of authority and their differing systems of values (and thus the
meanings that inhere in them) in fashioning their own identity” (Eisele 2002:
6).
Eisele recognises four recurring ‘topoi’ or cultural tropes underlying the
value system of the most dominant regime of authority about the Arabic lan-
guage (Eisele 2000; Eisele 2002). These are motifs which frequently emerge in
the narrative about the Arabic language; namely: unity, purity, continuity and
competition.The topos of unityunderscores the value of theArabic language as
uniting pre-Islamic Arabs in a single culture. This topos has beenmore recently
“reinterpreted in the service of various nationalisms, initially Islamic but most
strongly and successfully for Arab nationalism and Arab unity” (Eisele 2002:
7). The topos of purity encapsulates the traditional preoccupation to protect
the Arabic language from ‘contamination’ resulting from interaction with non-
Arab populations following the spread of Islam. In the modern period, this is
exemplified in the prescriptivist role of education and language academies in
maintaining the purity of “the classically derived modern written language”
and stigmatisation of the Arabic vernaculars (Eisele 2002: 7). Continuity is
linked to the “development of a complex andhighly esteemedwritten tradition,
which is passed down through the generations and in which inheres the most
highly valued features of the culture” (Eisele 2002: 7). In modern times, this
topos can be seen in the 19th century revival of Arab culture and theArabic lan-
guage with an emphasis on the classical literary canon as a source for modern
values.Competition involves rivalrywith other languages, initially other Islamic
languages such as Persian and Turkish, but more recently European colonial
languages, particularly English.
While Eisele states that he has derived these four topoi frommodern narra-
tives of the ‘story of Arabic’ reflecting the dominant authoritative practice, he
demonstrates that these topoi can also be found in rival authorising practices.
For example, he applies his framework to the work of Salama Musa (an Egyp-
tian nationalist and proponent of ʿāmmiyya) and reveals that although Musa’s
aimwas to subvert dominant beliefs about Arabic, “he nevertheless reflects the
dominant Arab way of talking about language” (Eisele 2003: 53).
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Inmy analysis, I supplement Eisele’s topoi with three further topoi: conspir-
acy, authenticity and superiority. While my aim is to capture the ideological
arguments of the pro-ʿāmmiyya interviews more closely, these supplementary
topoi may also be found in the dominant authoritative practice about Ara-
bic. The topos of conspiracy relates to the perception that language is under
threat due to a conspiracy to undermine it. In the dominant authoritative
practice, Arabic is constructed as the victim of a colonial conspiracy to bring
about its demise. The topos of authenticity, which is an offshoot of the topos
of purity, captures the idea that a given code is the real language of the peo-
ple (Bassiouney 2014). In the dominant practice, fuṣḥā is constructed as the
sole authentic version of Arabic by discrediting colloquial varieties which are
denied the status of ‘real’ languages. The topos of superiority overlaps with
the topoi of purity and continuity where these are valued as superior quali-
ties. However, I intend it mainly for qualities which are seen to be inherent to a
language andwhich cannot be objectively evaluated (e.g. beauty,melody, logic,
etc.). In the dominant practice, fuṣḥā is typically endowed with such superior
qualities (Ferguson 1997 [1959]).
The second theoretical approach I employ focuses on the way in which
interviewees project and construct their personal identity, as well as Egyptian
identity, and how these identities form part of their ideologies. The analysis
here is premised on the notion of multiple identities, specifically, Omoniyi’s
(2006) analytical framework for studying the “hierarchy of identities”. Omoniyi
argues that “an individual’s various identity options are co-present at all times
but each of those options is allocated a position on a hierarchy based on the
degree of salience it claims in a moment of identification” (2006: 19). These
moments of identification “are points in time in performance and perception
at which verbal and non-verbal communicative codes … are deployed to flag
up an image of self or perspectives of it” (Omoniyi 2006: 21). Omoniyi notes
that language itself “is an acceptable identity marker”, “so that the alternative
languages not chosen in a given moment within an interaction would be
alternative identities that are backgrounded or that are less invoked” (2006:
20). My analysis therefore takes account of the verbal codes in the interview
transcripts vis-à-vis the identities and ideologies expressedby the interviewees.
The third theoretical framework draws on the discourse mythological ap-
proach, a critical discourse analysis approach developed by Darren Kelsey
(2012a; 2012b; 2014) for textual analysis of news stories. Central to this approach
is the concept of ‘myths’. The scholarly use of the term ‘myth’ “stresses the
unquestioned validity of myths within the belief systems of social groups that
value them” as opposed to the popular use of the term where it is synonymous
with falsehood (Kelsey 2014: 309). This is in line with the definition that Fer-
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guson (1997 [1959]) gives in an article dealing specifically with language myths
about Arabic, where language myths are described as:
… attitudes and beliefs [which] are probably current about the language
of the community as well as about other languages and language in
general. Some of these are true, i.e. correspond very well to objective
reality, others are involvedwith esthetic or religious notions the validity of
which cannot be investigated empirically, and still others which purport
to deal with facts are partly or wholly false.
ferguson 1997 [1959]: 150
As Kelsey (2014: 309) points out, “a myth is not a lie. Rather, it is a construc-
tionof meaning that serves a particular purpose through the confirmations and
denials of its distortion”. In this sense, myth becomes an expression of values
and ideologies; a means of legitimating the speaker’s position while simulta-
neously discrediting those who do not subscribe to the same values. In other
words, myth becomes “a vehicle for ideology” (Kelsey 2014: 313). By employing
cda conventions of studying dominant tropes and discursive constructions,
Kelsey’s approach aims to underline how ideology is transported throughmyth.
The three analytical approaches I highlighted have one thing in common: at
the heart of all of them is a concern with ideology. Throughout the analysis, I
employ “a neutral approach to ideology”:
This approachmeans that the analyst does not need to claim any freedom
from ideology; there is an open acceptance that our own perceptions, cri-
tiques and ideas are equally influenced by ideology. But since ideology is
not an exclusively negative term, it is this neutral approach that exempts
the analyst fromaccusations of hiding their own ideologies behind claims
of intellectual or analytical superiority or objectivism.
kelsey 2014: 313–314
To achieve this, I deliberately refrain from evaluating the validity of the inter-
viewees’ statements:mygoal is not tomake ideological judgments but tounder-
stand the very workings of language ideology. My analysis is presented in the
next two sections.
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The Liberal Egyptian Party
The Liberal Egyptian Party (lep) was a political party with an Egyptian sep-
aratist ideology established in 2008, although it was not officially recognised
by the government under laws which restricted the formation of new political
parties. lep was an offshoot of an earlier party founded in 2004 called Maṣr il-
Umm (Mother Egypt). In the interview, Abdel-Aziz Gamal El-Din explains that
the two parties only differ in name: after the application to establish Maṣr il-
Umm was rejected by the authorities, they could not re-apply under the same
name. Both parties, he explains, are an extension of the Egyptian nationalist
current which dates back to the early 20th century (cf. Suleiman 1996; 2003;
2008). He notes that the Internet has helped them communicate their views to
awider audience, but describes lep as “a party predominantly for intellectuals,
andnot somuch for themasses”.The activities of lephave received someatten-
tion in recent literature. Panović (2010) mentions that a ‘MasryWikipedian’ he
interviewed is a former lep member, while Darwish (2007) points to the role
of lep (then in its formative stages) in organising a televised celebration of the
(ancient) Egyptian new year in 2007.
The party had an agenda focussed on re-asserting the Egyptian ethnic iden-
tity, establishing a secular democratic national government emphasising the
separation of religion and state, and standardising the Egyptian vernacular.
The latter item in the agenda is the reason I identified lep as an agent of
change. It is worth noting however that following the 2011 revolution and in
the lead-up to the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections, lep assimilated into the
Social Democratic Egyptian Party which shares lep’s overarching aims for a
secular state, but does not have a language-related item in its official mani-
festo.
When I contacted lep and expressed my interest in their language policy,
they immediately nominated Abdel-Aziz Gamal El-Din for the interview. It
was clear that he was – to borrow Eisele’s (2000; 2003) term – the ‘language
maven’ in the party. One of four founding members of the party, Gamal El-
Din was seventy when I interviewed him. He spoke in a mixture of fuṣḥā and
ʿāmmiyyawhich is closer to the former than the latter. Gamal El-Din describes
himself as a “researcher of Egyptology” (bāḥith fi l-maṣriyyāt) with a particular
interest in “the evolution of the Egyptian language”. He has more recently
become known for editing and introducing a number of historical workswhich
chronicle specific periods in Egypt’s history (Gamal El-Din 2006; 2011b; 2012), in
addition to authoring books on aspects of Egyptian history (Gamal El-Din 2007;
2011c; 2013).This recent publishing activity has earnedhim the title of ‘historian’
(muʾarrikh) in publishers’ descriptions of his works.
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It is worth noting here that the focus of Gamal El-Din’s published works
is in line with lep’s Egyptian nationalist ideology. Three common themes
which run through all of them is a focus on Egyptian Coptic identity (and by
extension, Coptic Christianity) as an expression of authentic Egyptian identity,
identifying Arab (and by extension, Islamic) ‘invasions’ as a foreign element in
Egyptian history,1 and Egyptian nationalism and resistance against oppressors
and foreign invaders. It is worth noting that the first two themes are the same
themes which ran through the writings of Egyptian separatists such as Salama
Musa and Louis Awad (Suleiman 2008).
Gamal El-Din also established a printed magazine called Maṣriyya (Egyp-
tian, fem.) in the 70s, which has recently taken the form of an electronic blog.2
The magazine forwards the same themes mentioned above with particular
emphasis on Egyptian nationalism, democracy and secularism. Significantly,
one year after I interviewed him, Gamal El-Din published a book titled Ḥawl
Taṭawwurāt Lughatinā al-Miṣriyya al-Muʿāṣira (On the Evolution of our Mod-
ern Egyptian Language) (Gamal El-Din 2011a). This book fleshes out the view
of Egyptian Arabic (referred to as the Egyptian Language) which Gamal El-
Din expresses in the interview. In what follows, I will not evaluate the lin-
guistic accuracy of Gamal El-Din’s conceptualisation of the Egyptian Language
(henceforth, el), but will use this term prima facie and comment only on the
ideological aspects of the account given of it.
According to Gamal El-Din, all the living languages of the world have an
official level and a popular level; a language myth which normalises the lan-
guage situation in Egypt. Gamal El-Din deliberately refrains from using the
terms fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya. Instead, he refers to the popular and official levels
of ‘Egyptian language’. Significantly, even the official level (i.e. fuṣḥā) is quali-
fied as ‘Egyptian’, and it is the popular level not the official level which is seen
as the ‘original source’ of the language. When I used the term ʿāmmiyya to ask
him about his view of language in relation to Egyptian identity, he responded:3
seg1: The issue of Egyptian ʿāmmiyya has come to a problem of terminol-
ogy. I feel that some of those who claim to be linguists invest it to
1 The term commonly used in Arabic is al-futūḥāt al-islāmiyya (the Islamic conquests; literally
‘openings’), which has positive connotations. However, Gamal El-Din uses the markedly
negative term ghazw (invasion) instead. Similarly, Gamal El-Din (2013) uses the negatively
marked term iḥtilāl (occupation) to refer to the period of Ottoman rule in Egypt.
2 The blog can be found here: http://masryablog.blogspot.co.uk/2009/01/normal-0
-microsoftinternetexplorer4_18.html (accessed 01.07.2014).
3 Transcriptions of interview segments over 10 words long are provided in Appendix 1.
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demean the Egyptian language. Meaning that there would be an Egyp-
tian ʿāmmiyya and an Arab(ic) fuṣḥā, when, scientifically, this is not
really available. What is available is that there is an Egyptian language
which has been evolving throughout history and draws from all the
languages that have entered it, from Persian to Turkish, to Arabic, to
English, to German, to French, to Italian, to Greek … to Nubian and
African and Tamazight. All of these have entered the Egyptian lan-
guage. And all of these influences do not form the majority of the
Egyptian language so that we can call it a Greek language or a French
language or an English language or even an Arabic language, or Turk-
ish. No, we can call it an Egyptian language influenced by all this, and
herein lies the value of the Egyptian language; that, in absorbing all
the civilisations that have entered it, it was able to absorb the lexical
itemswhichhave come to it from these languages. But it has continued,
since ancient times and up until our present day, to dwell in its own
house of grammar4 rules. And this is very clear in the modern linguis-
tic studies which confirm that the modern or contemporary Egyptian
language is the daughter of ancient languages in its final contemporary
form which is present now, and which will of course evolve into other
forms as other forms emerge.
Two main myths can be noted in this account of el (noting that this account
addresses the popular level of el; i.e. ʿāmmiyya). The first myth is that Egypt
has a special assimilatory capacity which has enabled it to absorb various
cultures and civilisations throughout history. This myth is extended to lan-
guage, where el has absorbed some of these languages through its special
assimilatory power. Note that Egypt and el are frequently conflated in this
account. A second myth is that el is a direct descendant of ancient Egyp-
tian languages and that it has preserved its grammatical form over time. This
invokes Eisele’s topos of continuity, which is commonly found in the dom-
inant authoritative discourse in relation to fuṣḥā. Significantly, however, it
is essentially applied to ʿāmmiyya here. el is described as ‘the daughter of
ancient languages’ and this historical continuity contributes to it superior-
ity.
In line with the definition he presents in his book (Gamal El-Din 2011a),
Gamal El-Din then proceeded to explain that el – like any other language – has
two levels: an Egyptian fuṣḥā and an Egyptian ʿāmmiyya; the latter is the level
4 Boldface indicates words which were said in English in the interview.
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of everyday use and the former is the level used in the writing of ‘newspapers
and magazines, etc.’. However, he refuses to refer to this latter level as Arabic
fuṣḥā, offering the following reasoning:
seg2: … but for fuṣḥā to be called Arabic, I don’t really think that there was,
at some point in time, an Arabic fuṣḥā language which existed in any
clear historical period. There was an Arabic language, which was an
amalgamation of many disparate languages which were present in the
Arabian Peninsula, and which varied amongst them in the names of
things: in the names for palm trees, and the names for lion, and the
names for sword. And it is normal for a language which develops in a
poor desert community to be less advanced and accomplished than
a language which has developed in an agricultural community like
Egypt.The agricultural community inEgypthas contributedanancient
civilisation with multiple levels in culture, arts, science, language and
literature, which cannot be attained by what I call ‘the tongues’ (al-
alsina). And I insist on calling them ‘tongues’ because theyweremostly
spoken and not written […] and they were only written belatedly, and
when they were written it was at a time when this language had not
yet stabilised. […] Indeed, when the whole region wanted to learn
Arabic in themodern, contemporary age, they resorted to the Egyptian
teacher. They actually say that the Egyptian is teaching them Arabic;
it is impossible for the Egyptian to teach them Arabic; he will teach
them Egyptian […] If the whole region is Arab then they don’t need an
Egyptian teacher to teach them Arabic; but when they learned, they
learned Egyptian.
Again, a number of myths can be traced here. First, the myth that a language
which develops in an agricultural environment is more sophisticated than a
language which develops in a desert environment. The second myth is that a
written language is more prestigious than a spoken language. Two more lan-
guage myths about Arabic can be found in the excerpt: that the Arabs of the
Arabian Peninsula did not speak a single language, and that Egyptian teach-
ers of Arabic teach ‘Arabs’ el. This latter myth is significant because it implies
that the fuṣḥā used by ‘all Arabs in the region’ is in fact ‘Egyptian’ (effec-
tively stripping ‘Arabs’ of ‘Arabic’ and of a standard/written language of their
own). The topos of superiority is invoked throughout this excerpt, and the
myths outlined above help to achieve this: el is superior to ‘the Arabic tongues’
because it developed in an agricultural environment and was recorded in writ-
ing earlier. Significantly, the distinction between el/Egypt/Egyptians/Egyp-
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tian culture is blurred, to the effect that the superiority of el over ‘Arabic
tongues’ becomes synonymous with the superiority of Egypt and Egyptians
over Arabs.
As Gamal El-Din explains in the interview, it is the popular level of el (i.e.
ʿāmmiyya) which lep seek to codify to become the official language of Egypt.
He argues that the authentic language is that which people use, saying that
‘language is the daughter of the people and the populace not the intellectuals’
(al-lugha hiya ibnit al-gumhūr wa-l-nās, mish ibnit al-musaqqafīn) – employ-
ing the metaphor of parenthood a second time. He asserts that all Egyptians
‘essentially speak the same language, with only slight differences, possibly at
the phonetic level but not at the grammatical level’ (seg3).The codified variety,
he explains, should be modelled after the el found in art forms such as poetry,
theatre and cinema ‘where Egyptian fuṣḥā is absent’. Gamal El-Din points to
the shortcomings of the Arabic writing system in representing the full range of
‘Egyptian phonics’ and says that this writing system will need to be adapted,
or indeed an entirely new writing system adopted, in the process of codifying
el. Significantly, Gamal El-Din makes it clear that the process of codifying el
involves simply recording it, and not laying down rules for it since the people
who use it have already established its rules.
Two topoi are invoked in laying out this argument: authenticity and unity.
The popular level of el which lep seek to make official is the ‘real’ language
which Egyptians – all Egyptians – speak. This in turn suggests the superiority
of el. This is made explicit later in the interview when Gamal El-Din asserts
that recent developments such as the relaxation of publishing laws and the
spread of mobile phones and the Internet have favoured el because it is “the
smoothest and easiest in interaction, circulation and derivation” (al-aslas wa-
l-ashal fi l-tadāwul wa-l-taʿāmul wa-fi l-ishtiqāq). He cites words such as ‘save’
and ‘delete’ which have been embedded in everyday spoken el, for exam-
ple dallituh ([he] deleted [it]). For Gamal El-Din, authenticity seems to be at
odds with purity. Purity, which is positively valued in the dominant author-
itative discourse about Arabic, is in fact negatively valued in Gamal El-Din’s
account. This in turn invokes the topos of competition: el competes with (and
is metaphorically ‘besieged’ by) Arabic. The tension between them is transmit-
ted in a binary of progressive el on the one hand versus archaic Arabic on the
other. This tension is also reflected at the level of identity, where ‘Egyptian’ and
‘Arab’ are seen as contradictory categories. Another aim which lep declared
in their mission statement was to delete the word ‘Arab’ from Egypt’s official
title,The Arab Republic of Egypt. In explaining the rationale behind this, Gamal
El-Din compares the title to the label ‘Egyptian Arabic’, which he categorically
rejects:
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seg4: Well this is the equivalent to [certain] people calling our language
Egyptian Arabic. It doesn’t work; I can’t be French English, or Egyptian
English, or Egyptian Arabic. You are putting together things … which
don’t really go together. I can’t be Arab and Egyptian. How could it be?
So they say, well, Arab is qawmiyya and Egyptian is waṭaniyya.5 No, I
am neither Egyptian qawmiyya nor Arab qawmiyya, I am [concerned
with] Egyptian identity.
This Egyptian identity according to Gamal El-Din encompasses anyone who
carries an Egyptian identification card. He highlights however the diversity of
Egyptians in terms of social, economic, religious, ethnic and class differences.
In spite of these differences, Egyptians share a “cultural” identity which dwells
in the “traditional Egyptian consciousness” (al-wigdān al-maṣrī al-taqlīdī) and
speak the same language. Crucially, although Gamal El-Din mentions many
types of diversity in the make-up of Egyptian identity, linguistic diversity is
not among them. Instead, language becomes the one shared feature among an
otherwise diverse nation (invoking once more the topos of unity).
Addressing the increasing emphasis on Egyptian identity in recent times,
Gamal El-Din attributes this to the “failure of the project of [pan-]Arab unity
and qawmiyya”. He states that Nasser’s pan-Arab policies were a cause for
division. He reasons that pan-Arabism in Egypt came to be associated with
Islam, so that when pan-Arabism faded, only Islam was left. This, he says, has
created a problem for the Copts who rejected pan-Arabism because now it
would appear as though they are rejecting Islam, resulting in sectarian strife
as a by-product of so-called pan-Arabism. Gamal El-Din states that pan-Arab
authorities persecuted those who championed Egyptian identity or wrote in
ʿāmmiyya such as Louis Awad, andmentions that he himself cameunder attack
when he established his magazine Maṣriyya (in the 1970s) only because it was
named ‘Egyptian’. At the time, speaking in the name of Egypt and Egyptianness
was categorically rejected as anti-pan-Arabism. These authorities, Gamal El-
Din says, are now no more; they have weakened and retreated, accounting for
the ‘return’ to Egyptian identity. He is quick to point out however that pan-
Arabism as an ideology still exists and that lep often comes under attack from
5 While both terms would translate into nationalism in English, there is a subtle difference in
meaning. The term waṭaniyya derives from the Arabic word waṭan, while qawmiyya invokes
the concept of umma. While waṭan refers to “the place to which a person belongs, the
fatherland”, umma refers to “the group of which a person is a member, the nation” (Suleiman
2003: 114). The term qawmiyya is particularly known for its use as a qualifier in pan-Arab
nationalism (al-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya).
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pan-Arabists and those “who are still under the illusion that it is possible to
resurrect pan-Arabism”. Hence the competition/tension highlighted between
el and Arabic at the linguistic level, and between ‘Egyptian’ and ‘Arab’ at
identity level, is extended to tension between Egyptian separatism and pan-
Arabism at the ideological level.
Malamih Publishing House
Malamih is a publishing house established by Mohamed El-Sharkawi in 2007
with a mission to empower young Egyptian writers “without ideological, na-
tional, or linguistic boundaries”.6 By the time I interviewed El-Sharkawi in July
2010,Malamihhadpublishedmore than 75works by Egyptianwriters in a range
of language varieties and combinations, including fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyya, English,
French, fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya, and English and Latinised Arabic. This overtly
liberal attitude towards publishing in varieties other than Standard Arabic is
the reasonMalamihwas identified as an agent of language change. El-Sharkawi
emphasises this point in the interview, indicating that other publishers who
publish works in ʿāmmiyya do not promote this openly.
I should point out that Malamih mysteriously closed down towards the end
of 2011, shortly after which El-Sharkawi left Egypt. His current whereabouts
remain unknown despite my best efforts to locate him. It appears that the
closure of the publishing house was financially motivated, although political
factors may have also played a part. El-Sharkawi had had his skirmishes with
the Egyptian authorities because of his anti-regime views and his affiliation
with the pro-democracy group, Kifāya (Enough). He was jailed several times
for short periods between 2006 and 2010, the most recent being a little over a
month before I interviewed him in 2010.
The issue of identity is particularly salient in this interview; the identity of
Malamih as a publishing house is inseparable from the identity of its founder,
Mohamed El-Sharkawi. As well as referring to Malamih in the third person, El-
Sharkawi alternates between the first person pronouns ‘I’ (ana) and ‘we’ (iḥna)
when he talks about the publishing house. Using Omoniyi’s (2006) ‘hierarchy
of identities’ framework, the identity which El-Sharkawi foregrounds the most
is his political identity as a leftist, anti-regime activist. At the beginning of
the interview, El-Sharkawi addressesMalamih’s declaredmission of publishing
6 FromMalamih’s website: http://www.malamih.com/ar/index.php?option=com_content
&task=view&id=5&Itemid=6 (last accessed October 2010). The website is no longer active.
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works ‘without boundaries’ to include the caveat: “There are boundaries. In the
end I am leftist; I cannot publish something which talks about capitalism for
example; I cannot publish something which supports the regime. There is a
political dimension in the matter” (seg5).
El-Sharkawi’s activist identity is similarly fronted at various other points in
the interview, where he highlights his differences withMubarak’s government,
particularly his multiple arrests for his political views. He refers to himself
as a “highly confrontational person” (shakhṣ ṣidāmi giddan) and a [political]
“instigator” (muḥarriḍ). He also mentions his previous employment in a leftist
publishing house,Merit. El-Sharkawi was 28 years old when I interviewed him,
and his bias to young writers is a bias to his own generation; he mentions that
he is part of ‘a new generation’ in the publishing industry. Another aspect of
El-Sharkawi’s identity which comes up more than once in the interview is his
background. El-Sharkawi mentions at three different points that he is from
Kafr El-Sheikh, a rural governorate in the Nile delta. He refers to his humble
upbringing and his father’s small income and how he struggled to buy books
which he could not afford.
Returning toMalamih’s language ‘policy’, El-Sharkawi emphasises that it sets
them apart from other publishers. He explains that the reason they do not
enforce ‘linguistic boundaries’ is that “language is a means of communication,
it should not be an instrument for withholding culture from another” (seg6).
He vehemently states that the books Malamih publishes “will not undergo
linguistic editing because there is no such thing as editing a writer’s [work];
the writer is free” (seg7). The only caveat is that the writer does not offend
with their writing; that is, El-Sharkawi explains, they are free for example
to criticise the idea of religion, but not to criticise one religion in favour of
another. It is worth noting that despite Malamih’s ‘no-language-editing’ policy,
later in the interview El-Sharkawi mentions a novel written by a young writer
from his own home governorate where he heavily interfered to ‘correct’ the
ʿāmmiyya:
seg8: I was, myself I mean, correcting [it]; I interfered completely in this
novel […] I’m telling you I was removing [segments of] speech and
inserting speech. The girl [writer] is from Kafr El-Sheikh, the gover-
norate I come from. She had written very rural [literally, peasant-like]
speech; she had written speech which is impossible … – no one would
understand it.
El-Sharkawi removed regional expressions in the text, altered the spelling of
some words, and added diacritics (tashkīl) to others. What El-Sharkawi had
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evidently done was to ‘convert’ the script to Cairene ʿāmmiyya, calling to mind
the guidelines set out for the editors of Wikipedia Masry which reflect a clear
bias towards Cairene (Panović 2010).
While El-Sharkawi acknowledges that some ʿāmmiyya words may be repre-
sented in a range of ways using the Arabic writing system, it was clear that he
believed there was a ‘right’ way. For instance, he says that when writing the
word hatʾūl [she/you will say], the initial vowel should not be represented as
a long vowel; hence هتقول is correct, but هاتقول is incorrect. He explicitly states
that ʿāmmiyya “has principles [which govern] how wemust write it” (laha uṣūl
lāzim niktibha izzāy), and that [written] ʿāmmiyya “must include diacritics”
(lāzim yikūn fīh tashkīl fi l-lugha il-ʿāmmiyya).
El-Sharkawi’s attitude towards ʿāmmiyya warrants attention. He refers to it
as il-lugha il-ʿāmmiyya il-maṣriyya (the Egyptian colloquial language). What
is significant here is the qualifier ‘language’ which is a conscious choice on
El-Sharkawi’s part. El-Sharkawi explains that, from the start, Malamih has
been biased to ʿāmmiyya because it reflects the distinctiveness (khuṣūṣiyya) of
Egypt(ians). They even raised the slogan Yasquṭ Sībāwēh (down with
Sībāwayh).7 “What have I got to do with Sībāwayh?” he says, “Sībāwayh was a
man who lived there; in Najd and Ḥijāz” (seg9).
El-Sharkawi’s view of ʿāmmiyya is inseparable from his view of fuṣḥā. He
states that, even though he studied Arabic at Al-Azhar University, he could not
be less concerned with fuṣḥā grammar rules, meter and rhyme, etc. He refers
to fuṣḥā as lugha aṣīla (pure language)8 to mean that it has not developed
from any other language. This he says makes it a very difficult language with
complicated grammar. ʿāmmiyya on the other hand is not a ‘pure language’,
which makes it easier and more flexible:
seg10: ʿāmmiyya language givesmemore room to express [myself], given that
I am Egyptian, and it reaches a lot of people, as opposed to fuṣḥā. Not
everyone has a taste for fuṣḥā, and it is always difficult because … the
Arabic language (il-lugha il-ʿarabiyya), meaning the language of the
ḍād9 (lughit iḍ-ḍād), is tough and very difficult. It is even classed as
one of the [most] difficult languages in the world, like … like German,
7 A famous 8th century Arabic grammarian.
8 The Arabic word aṣīl (m.; aṣīla fem.) is an adjective which denotes authenticity, purity
(especially of lineage) and rootedness (i.e. being well-established). It is often used with
respect to animals, for example ḥiṣān ʿarabī aṣīl (horse of pure Arab breed), and is used here
in that sense.
9 The Arabic language was labelled ‘the language of the ḍād’ by early Arab grammarians after a
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because German is a pure language and Arabic (il-ʿarabiyya) is a pure
language, meaning that it is not derived from anything.
He elaborates:
seg11: ʿāmmiyya is also rich with its terminology, but also because many for-
eign words have entered it and because it is not a pure language –
meaning that ʿāmmiyya is not pure. ʿāmmiyya at the end of the day
is Coptic mixed with Greek mixed with Hieroglyphic mixed with Ara-
bic. This is not our language; meaning Arabic (il-ʿarabiyya) is not a
language of Egyptians. […] This is why we invented ʿāmmiyya. Why
is Egyptian ʿāmmiyya the only one which is understood throughout
the – Arab – World? It is impossible for Palestinian ʿāmmiyya to be
understood throughout the Arab World – in the Levant [perhaps]; it
is impossible for Algerian – not the Tamazight, the Arabic, which is
called ‘il-darga’ [dārija] in Algeria – to be understood [throughout the
ArabWorld].
El-Sharkawi goes on to claim that Egyptian ʿāmmiyya is the only colloquial
Arabic understood throughout the Arab World. When asked why this is so, he
replies:
seg12: Because it has its distinctiveness, and because … it is derived from
several things, and it’s easy, and I can explain many things with it, it’s
verbose; it has verbosity, and it sounds nice to the ear. Algerian doesn’t,
Iraqi doesn’t. […] We are closer to the Arabic language (il-lugha il-
ʿarabiyya) than any of the other languages\ dialects, but at the same
time it (ʿāmmiyya) gives me space [to elaborate], because it is not a
pure language.
These three segments (seg10 to seg12) require detailed analysis. While El-
Sharkawi refers to ʿāmmiyya in the interview as ‘the Egyptian ʿāmmiyya lan-
guage’ (il-lugha il-ʿāmmiyya il-maṣriyya) – sometimes contracted to ‘the Egyp-
tian ʿāmmiyya’ (il-ʿāmmiyya il-maṣriyya) or simply il-ʿāmmiyya – he refers to
fuṣḥā in a number of ways (red). In particular, he uses the words for Arabic
letter in the Arabic alphabet denoting a sound which was thought to be unique to Arabic
(Suleiman 2012). It is worth noting that this label usually invokes linguistic pride, but El-
Sharkawi uses it sarcastically.
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(il-ʿarabī or il-ʿarabiyya) to refer exclusively to fuṣḥāwhile ʿāmmiyya is not qual-
ified with this label at any point in the interview. Note also that both fuṣḥā
and ʿāmmiyya are referred to as languages. However, El-Sharkawi is not as will-
ing to award this title to other Arabic colloquials; when he begins to refer
to them as ‘languages’ (lughāt) in seg12 this is quickly repaired to ‘dialects’
(lahagāt), a labelwhichhedoes not use in conjunctionwithEgyptian ʿāmmiyya
at all.
There are many language myths which can be extracted from El-Sharkawi’s
account of fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyya and other colloquial Arabics (summarised in table
9.1). These myths invoke a number of topoi. The topos of purity, which is tra-
ditionally invoked to exalt fuṣḥā, is portrayed here as a shortcoming: ʿāmmiyya
is simpler and more flexible than fuṣḥā because it is not a pure language.
The topos of authenticity is also invoked; ʿāmmiyya is closer to the Egyp-
tian people because they are a “people with an auditory culture” (shaʿb saqaf-
tuh samʿiyya). It is worth noting here that although El-Sharkawi paints an
overall negative picture of fuṣḥā in comparison to ʿāmmiyya, he does not
explicitly state that ʿāmmiyya is superior. For instance, when he compares the
restricting conciseness of fuṣḥā to the verbosity of ʿāmmiyya, he acknowledges
that both of these qualities have their advantages and disadvantages. Con-
versely, when El-Sharkawi compares ʿāmmiyya to other colloquial Arabics, he
is adamant that the former is better. The ‘rationalised evaluations’ provided
to support his view invoke the topos of superiority (cf. Ferguson 1997 [1959]).
For example, the theme of inherent beauty which is often associated with
fuṣḥā is reappropriated here for ʿāmmiyya, which ‘sounds nicer’ than other
colloquial Arabics. This is also evident in El-Sharkawi’s choice to reserve the
label ‘language’ for Egyptian ʿāmmiyya, but relegate other colloquial Arabics to
‘dialects’.
Another myth in the excerpts is that Egyptians ‘invented’ ʿāmmiyya as a way
of forging their own language in response to the foreignness of fuṣḥā. Like
lep’s Gamal El-Din, El-Sharkawi describes ʿāmmiyya as a hybrid variety with
input from multiple languages and evaluates this positively. However, he does
not consider ʿāmmiyya an extension of ancient Egyptian languages, conceding
in seg13 below that it is ‘not our language’. El-Sharkawi’s view of ʿāmmiyya
is closely linked to his view of Egyptian identity; both Egypt and ʿāmmiyya
are special – they have their ‘distinctiveness’ (khuṣūṣiyya; small capitals in
excerpts). He uses this term again when asked whether a poetry collection
published by Malamih was in fuṣḥā or ʿāmmiyya:
seg13: Poems in fuṣḥā, but in our fuṣḥā, not the fuṣḥā of the Bedouins of the
[Arabian] Peninsula … I’m sorry, but I’m against\ they don’t\ they …
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table 9.1 Language myths in El-Sharkawi’s account of fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyya and other colloquial
Arabics
fuṣḥā ʿāmmiyya Other colloquial Arabics
Far from people Close to people
Pure language Impure language






Complex/difficult Simple/easy Not as simple/easy
Sounds nice Do not sound (as) nice





the Wahhabis have ruined Egyptians’ lives generally – even in Islam
they have their own interpretations – but also those of the Peninsula
ruined the language, I mean ours. In the end this is not our language,
but you discover that we have our distinctiveness; our ʿāmmiyya
has distinctiveness and it has amazing pronunciation and writing
rules, but of course no one cares for them.
This account transports the myth that Egyptians have their own version of
fuṣḥā. However, unlike Gamal El-Din, El-Sharkawi does not go as far as to claim
that the fuṣḥāused everywhere in theArabic-speakingworld is Egyptian fuṣḥā.
In fact, El-Sharkawi highlights that the Egyptian fuṣḥā he refers to is different
from the fuṣḥā of the ‘Bedouins of the Arabian Peninsula’. Also unlike Gamal
El-Din, El-Sharkawi’s idea of ‘distinctiveness’ does not carry clear separatist
nationalistic undertones. However, the superiority of Egyptians is still implied:
El-Sharkawi refers to the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula as Bedouins and then
uses the Arabic words bitūʿ shibh il-gizīra (those of the Peninsula) which have
a derogatory tone to them. This mirrors the superiority of Egyptian ʿāmmiyya
over other colloquial Arabics expressed above.
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El-Sharkawi notes that Malamih has two main agendas, change and a secu-
lar state10 (taghyīr w-dawla madaniyya), and even though the work they pub-
lished does not necessarily further these agendas in a direct way, they cer-
tainly wouldn’t publish works which support a religious state or the political
status quo. The overlap in the views of religion between Gamal El-Din and El-
Sharkawi is worth noting here, particularly their aspiration for a secular state
and their antagonism towards the religious influence of theArabianGulf coun-
tries. Indeed, seg13 suggests that Egyptians not only have their own distinct
version of fuṣḥā but also of Islam.
El-Sharkawi acknowledges the increase in publishing activity in ʿāmmiyya,
owing this to the relaxation in publishing rules and the emergence of more
publishers. Writers are no longer forced to publish via government publishers
where the approval process alone can take up to seven years. Now there are
many private publishers and writers have more choice. However, El-Sharkawi
notes that even though works published in ʿāmmiyya are on the rise, they are
not presented as such, which is where Malamih stands out. He adds that other
publishers who have published several works in ʿāmmiyya deny that this is
an orientation they have. They are quick to state that the opinions expressed
in the works they publish are those of the authors. This statement provokes
El-Sharkawi who says this is not true; “If I am not convinced then I should
not publish [it], because this represents me and represents my orientations,
ambitions and ideologies” (seg14).
According to El-Sharkawi, publishers’ reluctance to support ʿāmmiyya
overtly owes to the stigmatisation of publishing in ʿāmmiyya. Even though the
flourishing of private publishing has curtailed the policing of the language
authorities and the hegemony of the standard language, there is constant ten-
sion between those who write and publish in ʿāmmiyya and the upholders of
the standard language. For instance, El-Sharkawi mentions how others in the
publishing circle frequently criticise Malamih’s language policy and tell him
that he must do this or that:
seg15: They would start to say “No, Mohamed, you cannot do that” or
“Mohamed it is imperative (lāzim) that you do I-don’t-know-what”. So
I tell them, yes, it is imperative, so we will do that which is imperative
10 The concept of dawla madaniyya (literally, ‘civil state’) is too complex to cover in this
chapter. It is translated into ‘secular state’ here because it was clearly intended to mean
this in the two interviews. The termhas gainedwider currency and attracted the attention
of academics post-2011. I refer the reader to De Poli (2014) for a useful delineation.
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in another publishing house, but because we established Malamih
to break all imperatives, we are doing all the things which are not
imperative.
This repetition of the word lāzim (imperative) is significant as it highlights
Malamih’s strife with the language authorities, invoking the topos of compe-
tition. Because it is deliberately challenging the hegemony of fuṣḥā and violat-
ing linguistic norms, Malamih is portrayed as both (linguistically) daring and
deviant.
Significantly, El-Sharkawi notes that it was when they started publishing in
English that they came under the most attack and Malamih was accused of
“undermining the foundations of Egyptian culture” (bitqawwiḍūarkān il-saqāfa
il-maṣriyya). He explains their motive for publishing in English noting that it
acknowledges the presence of an audience that prefers to read and write in
this language: “bilingual people who speak both [Arabic and English]” (il-nās
illi humma bilingual; illi humma biyitkallimu il-itnēn) or those who think in
English. He points to youths educated in prominent private universities, with
special reference to the American University in Cairo (auc). He also cites the
economic virtues of publishing in English: books they publish in English, he
says, are priced higher, because the target readers are willing to pay more for
them. Malamih’s English novels range in price between l.e. 50 and l.e. 80, the
Arabic books sell for around l.e. 20. Hence, although the English books do not
necessarily sell more than the Arabic books, they generate more revenue. As
El-Sharkawi puts it, publishing one book in English enables them to finance
5 books in Arabic. It is clear that Malamih’s motives for publishing in English
are very different from the motives to publish in ʿāmmiyya. While El-Sharkawi
is clearly passionate about publishing in the latter, the former is more of an
economic necessity. On publishing in the two language varieties he says: “We
want what unites [people] not what divides. The English language divides, it
does not unite; in the end of the day how many people will read a novel [in]
English?” (seg16).
This invokes the topos of unity. When El-Sharkawi speaks of the variety
which ‘unites’ Egyptian people, he is referring to ʿāmmiyya. The audience he
wants to reach is young Egyptians whom he is aiming to attract with a lan-
guage which is accessible to them in order to trigger their interest in social
issues. These he reaches by publishing books in ʿāmmiyya which are priced to
make them affordable to a wide range of readers. English, he acknowledges,
enables him to reach a different audience: a much smaller audience, granted,
(hence the ‘dividing’ capacity of English), but one with substantial economic
capital.
Jacob Høigilt and Gunvor Mejdell - 9789004346178
Downloaded from Brill.com11/06/2018 11:54:16PM
via free access
the politics of pro-ʿāmmiyya language ideology in egypt 231
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted tohighlight the ideologicalmotives of twopro-
ʿāmmiyya agents of change inEgyptwhowere interviewed in 2010by examining
the interviews through three analytical lenses (Eisele’s topoi, the discourse
mythological approach, and the hierarchy of identities).
One of the most notable findings of the interview analysis was the range
of terms used to refer to fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya. Gamal El-Din’s concept of ‘the
Egyptian language’ (al-lugha al-miṣriyya) is particularly significant. The elabo-
rate concept, which was clearly based on an ideological foundation espousing
the superiority of Egyptians, does not only demonstrate the existence of differ-
ent terminological traditions in Egyptian society (even if they only belong in
the realm of ‘folk linguistics’), but also that the same term can mean different
things to different people. Compare for exampleGamal El-Din’s use of the term
‘Egyptian language’ to El-Sharkawi’s use of the same term: the former used it to
refer to a system which encompasses both fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya (in the same
way that al-lugha al-ʿarabiyya would be used), while the latter used it to refer
specifically to ʿāmmiyya.
Another example of how ideologies can be mediated through linguistic
labels is in the conscious labelling of ʿāmmiyya as a ‘language’ (lugha) in both
interviews. Gamal El-Din denies the Arabian ‘tongues’ (alsina) of old the status
of languages. Similarly, El-Sharkawi reserves the label ‘language’ for Egyptian
ʿāmmiyya but refers to other colloquial varieties of Arabic as ‘dialects’ (lahgāt).
These labels feed into the constructed superiority of Egyptian ʿāmmiyya in both
cases.
The role of language choice as an identity marker in the interviews was
not straightforward. While the use of ‘elevated’ ʿāmmiyya by El-Sharkawi with
occasional English words is in line with the identity of the educated, pro-
ʿāmmiyyaMarxist, Gamal El-Din’s language choice flouts expectations. That is,
Gamal El-Din’s use of a mixed variety which was arguably closer to fuṣḥā than
ʿāmmiyya at many points goes against his pro-ʿāmmiyya ideology. To account
for this, onemust acknowledge thewider pool of indexes associatedwith fuṣḥā
and ʿāmmiyya (cf. Bassiouney 2014). While the use of fuṣḥā might be at odds
with Gamal El-Din’s political ideology, it serves to project the identity of the
knowledgeable intellectual, lending authority to Gamal El-Din’s statements.
The most important findings were perhaps in the area of language myths.
Here, the discourse mythological approach was particularly helpful. Subject-
ing the interviews to discourse analysis does not only bring out the myths in
the discourse, but also demonstrates how thesemyths are transported through
language choice, argumentation, metaphors, labelling, hedging and the use of
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pronouns. It is important to reiterate here that the termmyth is used indepen-
dently of its truth value; it does notmatterwhether a ‘myth’ is true or false,what
matters is its unquestionable validity to a certain group. The discourse mytho-
logical approach and Eisele’s topoi complement each other as various topoi are
often invoked through myths. What is particularly striking is how the topoi in
the dominant authoritative discourse about Arabic were reappropriated in the
pro-ʿāmmiyya discourse of the two interviews. The occurrence of these topoi
in the interviews is summarised in table 9.2.
It is worth pointing to the overlap in the ideologies of lep and Malamih:
both are pro-ʿāmmiyya and share similar ideas about separation of religion
and state. Crucially, they were both at odds with the government authori-
ties generally and the language authorities more specifically. However, despite
the similarities between lep’s professed Egyptian nationalism and Malamih’s
emphasis on the ‘distinctiveness’ of Egyptians, therewas amarkeddifference in
how they viewed Egypt in relation to the ArabWorld. When El-Sharkawi com-
pares ʿāmmiyya to other colloquial Arabics, he places Egypt within an ‘Arab
World’ (seg11), a concept which is completely absent from Gamal El-Din’s
accountwho refers to ‘Arabs in the region’ instead (seg2). Onemight argue that
while Gamal El-Din expressed ‘separatist Egyptian nationalism’, El-Sharkawi
expressed ‘integral Egyptian nationalism’: the former views Egypt as entirely
removed from the ArabWorld, while the latter captures a view of Egypt as dis-
tinct from the ArabWorld but “with strong non-national links with the Arabic
speaking countries” (Suleiman 2008: 39).
Moreover, even though lep and Malamih shared a pro-ʿāmmiyya ideol-
ogy, there were significant differences in their arguments. lep’s Gamal El-
Din considered ʿāmmiyya the genetic offspring of Egyptian languages, while
El-Sharkawi who asserted the distinctiveness of Egyptian ʿāmmiyya did so
while identifying it as a language with foreign origins; one which is ultimately
‘not ours’. Similarly, while Gamal El-Din expressed unequivocal support for
ʿāmmiyya, Malamih’s ‘bias’ for ʿāmmiyya was coupled with ‘linguistic liberal-
ism’: an openness to publish in a range of linguistic forms in order to reach
different audiences.
Finally, even though the two interviews were conducted prior to substantial
political change in Egypt and both lep and Malamih no longer exist in the
capacity in which I interviewed them in 2010, this chapter demonstrates that
the ideologies expressed are embedded within a web of enduring social and
geopolitical concerns.
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demonstrate superiority of ʿāmmiyya
over fuṣḥā;
Fuṣḥā is essentially Egyptian –What
‘Arabs’ speak is Egyptian
Rationalised evaluations to
demonstrate that Egyptian ʿāmmiyya
is superior to other colloquial
Arabics;
The concept of an Egyptian fuṣḥā
which is superior to ‘Bedouin’ fuṣḥā
Unity
ʿāmmiyya is unifying and authentic: it
is closer to the people on the streets;
ʿāmmiyya is the real language that all
Egyptians speak
Authenticity
English is dividing and unauthentic:
it is used by a select few
Purity
The ‘Egyptian language’ is a daughter
of ancient (Egyptian) languages. It is
a hybrid and continually evolving
language with the assimilatory
power to absorb lexical items from
many foreign civilisations while
Fuṣḥā is a pure language (lugha
aṣīla), but this is a negative feature;
Strength of ʿāmmiyya lies in its
hybridity because it makes it more
flexible
maintaining its own grammar – and
Continuity herein lies its value Not explicit
Competition
Linguistic: ʿāmmiyya ‘besieged’ by
fuṣḥā;
Identity: Egyptian vs. Arab;
Ideological: Egyptian nationalist vs.
pan-Arabist
Strife with language authorities
Conspiracy
Not explicit Wahhabis have ruined Egyptians’
language and religion
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Appendix: Interview Transcripts
seg1
…mawḍūʿ il-ʿāmmiyya l-maṣriyya dakhal fi mushkilit muṣṭalaḥ. ana baḥiss inn huwwa
baʿḍ il-…muddaʿī ʿilm il-lughabiyastasmirūh li-l-ḥaṭṭminmustawā il-lugha il-maṣriyya.
bi-maʿnā inn tibʾa fīh ʿāmmiyyamaṣriyyawa-fuṣḥā ʿarabiyya, baynamā ʿilmiyyanda shēʾ
mish mutawaffir yaʿni. al-mutawaffir anna hunaka lugha maṣriyya tataṭawwar ʿabr al-
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tārīkh taʾkhuzmin kull il-lughāt illi dakhalit lahamin awwil il-fārisiyya ila l-turkiyya ila
l-ʿarabiyya ila l-inglīziyya ila l-almāniyya ila l-firinsiyya ila l-īṭāliyya ila l-yūnāniyya …
ila in-nūbiyya wa-l-ifrīqiyya wa-l-amāzīghiyya. kull da dakhal fi il-lugha l-miṣriyya. wa-
kullin min hāzihi l-muʾassirāt lā tushakkil ghālibiyyit al-lugha l-maṣriyya biḥēs niʾdar
nisammīhabi-ʾinnaha lugha yūnāniyya aw lugha firinsiyya aw lugha inglīziyya aw lugha
ʿarabiyya ḥatta, aw turkiyya. laʾ niʾdar nisammīha lugha miṣriyya mutaʾassira bi-kull
da, w-di qīmit il-lugha l-miṣriyya; innaha istaṭāʿat an tastawʿib, min ḍimnma-stawʿabit
kull il-ḥaḍārāt illi dakhalitha, tistawʿib il-mufradāt illi gatlaha min hazihi il-lughāt. wa-
lākinn ẓallat, munzu al-qidamwa-ḥatta al-yōm, taskun fi bēt al-qawāʿid wa-l-grammar
al-khāṣṣ bīha. w-da wāḍiḥ giddan fi il-dirāsāt al-lughawiyya il-ḥadīsa illi bituʾakkid
inn al-lugha al-maṣriyya il-ḥadīsa aw il-muʿāṣira hiya lugha ibnat al-lughāt il-adīma
fi shaklaha an-nihāʾī il-mawgūd al-muʿāṣir il-ʾān, w-illi ha-yitṭawwar ṭabʿan ila ashkāl
ukhra biẓuhūr ashkāl ukhra.
seg2
… amma ann il-fuṣḥā titsamma hiyya l-ʿarabiyya fa-ana yaʿni ma-aẓunnish inn fīh
fi waʾt min il-awʾāt kān fīh lugha ʿarabiyya fuṣḥā mawgūda fi ayy fatra tārīkhiyya
waḍḥa yaʿni. kān fīh lugha ʿarabiyya, hiya gimāʿ li-shitāt al-ʿadīd min al-lughāt illi kāt
mawgūda fi l-gazīra il-ʿarabiyya w-illi kānit bitakhtalif fī-mā baynahā fī asmāʾ al-ashyāʾ:
fi asmāʾ il-nakhīl wa-asmāʾ il-asad wa-asmāʾ il-sēf […] wa-huwa min aṭ-ṭabīʿi inn il-
lugha illi bitanshaʾ fī mugtamaʿ faqīr ṣaḥrāwī takūn aqall taṭawwuran wa-ingāzan min
lugha nashaʾat fī mugtamaʿ zirāʿī zayy maṣr. il-mugtamaʿ il-zirāʿi fi maṣr ʾaddim ḥaḍāra
qadīma zāta mustawayāt ʿadīda fi l-saqāfa wa-fi l-fann wa-fi l-ʿilm wa-fi l-lugha wa-fi l-
adab, lā yumkin an tatawaffar fī-mā yusammā bi-l-alsina, w-ana baʾuṣṣir ʿala inn ana
asammīha alsina laʾinnaha kānit tunṭaq wa-lā tuktab fi l-ghālib […] wa-lam tuktab illā
mutaʾakhirran, wa-ʿindamā kutibat kāna fī awqāt lissa hāzihi al-lugha lam tastaqirr […]
ḥattā anna kull il-manṭiʾa ʿindamā arādat fi l-ʿaṣr al-ḥadīs wa-l-muʿāṣir an tataʿallam al-
lugha al-ʿarabiyya kānat talgaʾ ilā al-mudarris al-maṣri. humma fi l-ḥaʾīʾa biysammūha
il-maṣri biyʿallimhum ʿarabi; mish mumkin il-maṣri yiʿallimhum ʿarabi; ha-yʿallimhum
maṣri […] kull il-manṭiʾa iza kānu ʿarab fa-humma mish fī ḥāga ilā mudarris maṣrī
yiʿallimhum ʿarabi, wa-lākinn lamma itʿallimu itʿallimu maṣri.
seg3
il-kull biyitkallim lugha taʾrīban waḥda, il-furūʾ bēnha furūʾ basīṭa, w-mumkin tikūn fi
baʿḍ iṣ-ṣawtiyyāt, innama mish fi qawāʿid il-lugha bitāʿithum.
seg4
ma-hu da nafs il-muʿādil li-fikrit inn nās tiʾullik […] ʿala l-lugha btāʿitna yiʾullik il-
ʿarabiyya il-maṣriyya. ma huwwama-yinfaʿsh; ma-yinfaʿsh abʾa il-inglīziyya il-firinsiyya,
aw il-inglīziyya il-maṣriyya, aw il-ʿarabiyya il-maṣriyya. yaʿni inti bitḥuṭṭi ḥagāt … ma-
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timshīsh yaʿni. ma-yinfaʿsh abʾa ʿarabi w-maṣri. izzāy tīgi? fa-yʾullak laʾ, ma l-ʿarabiyya
di l-qawmiyya w-il-maṣriyya di l-waṭaniyya. laʾ, ana la qawmiyya maṣriyya wa-la
qawmiyya ʿarabiyya, ana hawwiya maṣriyya.
seg5
fī ḥudūd. fi l-ākhir ana yasāri; mish haʾdar anshur ḥāga bititkallim ʿan ir-raʾsimāliyya,
masalan; mish haʾdar anshur ḥāga maʿa l-niẓām. fīh buʿd siyāsi fi l-mawḍūʿ.
seg6
il-lugha hiyya adāt tawāṣul, fa-mayinfaʿsh il-lugha tibʾa adāt manʿ saqāfa ʿan ākhar.
seg7
il-kutubmish hayiḥṣallaha taʿdīl lughawi laʾinnma-fīsh ḥāga ismaha inn ana aʿaddil ʿala
kātib; il-kātib huwwa ḥurr.
seg8
ana kunt baṣaḥḥaḥ, binafsi yaʿni; tadakhkhalt tamāman fi l-riwāya di […] ʿāyiz aʾullik
inn ana kunt bashīl kalām w-baḥuṭṭ kalām. il-bint min kafr il-shēkh barḍu, min nafs
muḥāfẓiti. fa-hiyya katba kalām fallāḥīni awi; yaʿni katba kalām mustaḥīl yaʿni … –
maḥaddish hayiʿrafuh.
seg9
ana māli bi-sībāwēh? sībāwēh da rāgil kan ʿāyish hināk; fi nagd w-il-ḥigāz.
seg10
il-lugha il-ʿāmmiyya bitiddīni barāḥ aktar fi t-taʿbīr, bima innī maṣri, w-bitiwṣal li-nās
kitīr awi, ʿaks il-fuṣḥā. il-fuṣḥāmish kull in-nās bitatazawwaqha,w-ṭūl il-waʾt hiyya ṣaʿba
laʾinn … il-lugha il-ʿarabiyya, lughit iḍ-ḍād yaʿni, qawiyya w-ṣaʿba giddan. ḥatta hiyya
muṣannafamin il-lughāt is-ṣaʿba fi l-ʿālam, zayy…zayy il-almāniyya, laʾinn il-almāniyya
lugha aṣīla w-il-ʿarabiyya lugha aṣīla, yaʿni mish mushtaqqa min ḥāga.
seg11
w-barḍu il-ʿāmmiyya ghaniyya bimufradātha, bass laʾinn barḍu dakhal ʿalēha kalimāt
dakhīla kitīr w-laʾinnaha lugha mish aṣīla, yaʿni il-ʿāmmiyya mish aṣīla. il-ʿāmmiyya
fi l-ākhir ibṭi ʿala yūnāni ʿala hīrūghlīfi ʿala ʿarabi. di mish lughitna; yaʿni il-ʿarabiyya
mish lughit maṣriyyīn. […] ʿashān kida iḥna ikhtaraʿna il-ʿāmmiyya. il-ʿāmmiyya il-
maṣriyya lēh hiyya il-waḥīda illi bititfihhim fi kull ḥitta fi l-ʿālam, il-ʿarabi? mustaḥīl
il-ʿāmmiyya il-filisṭīniyya titfihim fi l-ʿālam il-ʿarabi kulluh – ʿand il-shawām; mus-
taḥīl il-gazāʾiriyya – mish il-amāzīgh, il-ʿarabiyya, illi bititʾāl ‘il-dārga’ fi l-gazāʾir – tit-
fihim.
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laʾann hiyya laha khuṣūṣiyya, w-laʾinn … hiyya mittakhdamin kaza ḥāga, w-sahla, w-
baʾdar ashraḥ bīha ḥagāt kitīr, mushiba, yaʿni fīha ishāb, w-ḥilwa waqʿaha ʿa- l-widn.
il-gazāʾiri laʾʾa, il-ʿirāʾi laʾʾa. […] iḥna aʾrab li-l-lugha il-ʿarabiyya min il-lughāt\ il-lahagāt
it-tanya bass fi nafs il-waʾt hiyya bitiddīni barāḥ, laʾinn hiyya mish aṣīla.
seg13
shiʿr bi-l-fuṣḥā, bass bi-l-fuṣḥā btāʿitna, mish bifuṣḥit il-badw bitūʿ shibh il-gizīra …
I’m sorry, bass ana ḍidd\ humma mish\ humma … il-wahhābiyyīn bawwaẓu ḥayāt il-
maṣriyyīn ʿumūman – ḥatta fi l-islām yaʿni ʿanduhum tafsīrāthum – bass kamān bitūʿ
shibh il-gizīra bawwaẓu l-lugha, yaʿni bitāʿitna iḥna. iḥna fi l-ākhir dimish lughitna, bass
inti taktashifi inn iḥna līna khuṣūṣiyya. il-ʿāmmiyya līha khuṣūṣiyya w-līha qawāʿid
nuṭʾ w-ktāba rahība, bass ṭabʿan ma-ḥaddish biyibʾa maʿni bīha.
seg14
law ana mish muqtaniʿ il-mafrūḍ ma-nshursh, laʾʾin da biyʿabbar ʿanni w-biyʿabbar ʿan
tawagguhāti w-ṭumūḥāti w-afkāri.
seg15
… yʾūlu “laʾʾa ya mḥammad ma-yinfaʿsh tiʿmil kida” aw “mḥammad lāzim mish ʿarfa
tiʿmilu ēh”. fa-baʾulluh awyama-huda lāzim fa-l-lāzimdaha-niʿmiluh fi dār nashr tanya,
bass bima inn malāmiḥ ʿamalnāha ʿashān niksar bīha l-lāzim fa-iḥna biniʿmil kull il-
ḥagāt illi hiyyamish lāzim.
seg16
iḥna ʿayzīn illi yigammaʿ ma-yfarraʾsh. il-lugha il-ingilīziyya bitfarraʾ ma-bitgammaʿsh;
ir-riwāya fi l-ākhir kām waḥid ha-yiʾrāha ingilīzi?
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